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INFORMATION CHANNELS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING
HELEN M. INGRAM 0

Information is a political tracer element that delineates the
channels of communication within a decision making process. Up
until this decade, the channel from environmental interest to decision
makers was negligible. Information on the economic efficiency or the
regional development effects of actions affecting natural resources
was much more salient than intelligence on environmental impact. In
recent years, attempts have been made to generate more information
upon the implications of natural resources policy and feed it into the
decision making process. In particular, the National Environmental
Policy Act 1 is expressly aimed at accounting for environmental
impacts of governmental decisions.
The theory of this article is that the incremental and fragmented
process by which decisions are actually made imposes important
restraints upon the flow of information. The initial task is to catalogue
and describe these restraints, then to identify the factors that affect
channels of communication. \Vb.at determines which facts decision
makers take into consideration? \Vb.at motivates the generation and
transfer of information? This article will discuss the answers to these
questions and the possibilities of improving the current environmental
information basis.
FACTORS AFFECTING WHAT DECISION MAKERS HEAR
Classical formulations of problem solving involve the identification
and ranking of goals, the cataloging of methods of achieving those
goals and the investigation of the consequences of each alternative.
Unfortunately, formulations do not provide an accurate description of
decision making. 2 Such a policy making process would compel a
decision maker to reach out for all the related information to his
problem and analyze it. The decision making strategy that Lindblom
and Braybrooke call disjointed incrementalism is a better approxima
tion of the real world.3 Only policies which differ incrementally from
the status-quo are seriously considered, and, in consequence, decision
makers focus upon a quite limited number of alternatives in making
• Associate Professor of Government, University of Arizona; Former Staff Political Scientist,
National Water Commission.
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (1970).
2. Lindblom, The Policy Making Process Ch. III, (1968); Dror, Public Policy Making
Reexamined 86-87 (1968).
3. Braybooke & Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process
81-110 (1963).
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choices. Further, not all the consequences of any alternative are, in
fact, taken into account. There is a tendency among decision makers
to concentrate on the direct and immediate effects of decision,
discounting the remote, and imponderable, the intangible, and the
poorly understood. The practical decision-making strategy dictates
that a decision maker attend to the short run consequences in hope
that the long run will take care of itself-or that some other decision
maker in another setting will take care of it.
The information needs of decision makers are restricted in this
incremental and disjointed decision-making process. They are not
required to listen to all the interests that may have a stake in any
decision or to collect and weigh data on all possible impacts.
Furthermore, they are barraged by more information than they can
actually use in the limited choices they are comfortable in making.
Information overload is a likely problem. The fact is that the
receptivity of decision makers is screened by a number of considera
tions.
THE ISSUE CONTEXT affects what information the decision
makers are receptive to. Over time, participants in a policy area
develop a particular fix or conception of the dimensions of the issues
involved. Information is sorted out and used in decision making on the
basis of that conception, and data which related to another way of
thinking about the issue is never really considered. Aaron Wildavsky
explains the reluctance of the Eisenhower Administration to attend to
the political dangers of the Dixon-Yates controversy in terms of the
operative issue context. The Republican Administration conceived of
the issue as a public versus private power controversy. Although there
were numerous signals that the issue was likely to explode as a
question of conflict of interest, agency offficials and Presidential
advisers failed to take the cues. The information which might have
proceeded early warning was filtered out. 4
The issue context of water quality was for years a matter of health,
and information about the spread of communicable disease through
water supply overshadowed data about aesthetics, recreation, and
wildlife habitat. Water quality officials in the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare were such captives of the issue context that
they were unable to adjust to the changing dimensions of the question.
Ultimately the inability of these decision makers to receive and
process new categories of information led to the loss of HEW
jurisdiction over water quality programs.
Public works has been the issue context of a number of natural
4. Wildavsky, The Analysis of Issue-Contexts in Decision-Making, Revolt Against the Masses
(1971).
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resource policies, particularly water development. A dam, a levee, or
an irrigation project has been seen as a means to give local economies
a shot in the arm. One Congressman, a senior member of the House
Public Works Committee, expressed the following conception of the
water development issue:
A member of Congress from an arid western state, where
dependable water supply has held back both industries develop
ment and agricultural production, may perform his most effective
service for the economic future of his region by the promotion of
soundly conceived water resource developments. For a lawmaker
representing a coastal area it may be the building of a sea wall to
protect his town from the ocean's occasional ravages. H he serves
a locality where recurrent flood hazards exist, his primary project
may be the approval and eventual completion of a needed flood
control measure by the Corps of Engineers.5

The relevant information when water projects are conceived in such
terms includes the development possibilities of particular projects and
the strength and unity of local support. Environmental implications
are unlikely to be particularly salient.
THE SOURCE OF INFORMATION, evaluated in terms of the
decision maker's goals and interests, is a factor in determining its
receipt and consideration. A decision maker can not simply make
judgments, he must concern himself with building support for his
decisions. He must take care of his ability to influence, and attend to
the consequences of choices he makes upon his future ability to
influence. A decision n:iaker is most apt to listen to information
emitting from his constituency upon which he depends for continuing
support. The antennae of Congressmen are directed toward picking
up the preferences of individuals and groups important to their
renomination and reelection. Agencies relate particularly to commu
nications flowing from the groups served by agency programs-groups
which ordinarily assist the agency's protecting or extending its
authority budget and jurisdiction. Officials in the Soil Conservation
Service (SCS) listen attentively to local soil and water conservation
districts on proposed small watershed projects. The approval and
active backing of local sponsors is crucial to agreements on cost
sharing where local beneficiaries are required to pay back some
portion, and continuous local efforts are necessary to push a project
through the complicated authorizations and funding processes.6 The
same attention is not directed by the SCS to information sources apart
5. Wright, You and Your Congressman 49 (1965).
Allee & Ingram, Authorizations and Appropriations Processes for Water Resources
Development, Report to National Water Commission (1972).
6.
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.from the local sponsors. The frustration of the environmental agencies
from their inability to get access to the decision making process in the
SCS (and also the Corps of Engineers) was expressed by Nathaniel P.
Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Fish and Wildlife and
Parks before a Congressional hearing on channelization.
A large portion of the morale problem within my Department is
the result of rarely being listened to when we offer relevant
recommendations to other agencies on this problem. It is
discouraging for our biologists and field personnel to stand by
helplessly and watch the wetlands resource succumb to the dredge
bit or dragline bucket with little or no regard for the natural
system. 7
Sources of information which are not supporters of decision makers,
but which hold a recognized veto position over actions are heeded.
Once environmental groups had collected substantial numbers of
sympathetic Congressmen and Senators sensitive to their appeals,
their reception by Interior and Public Works Committees changed
markedly. Indicative perhaps is the fact that the mailing list for
announcements of hearings and activities of the House Public Works
Committee expanded from less than a dozen to more than 180
environmental organizations in the decade of the 1970's. The concern
of federal construction agencies for developing public participation
programs is a function of their interest in forestalling the stalemates
which have occurred in recent years with local conservation groups.
In actuality, regulated groups often veto decisions of the
governmental agencies assigned the task of regulating them. In the
long run, enforcement of regulation depends upon voluntary com
pliance. Because of physical and political constraints, regulators
cannot take punitive action against every violator of standards if the
violations are widespread. Consequently, the setting of standards, and
the choice of whom to prosecute for non-compliance depends not
only upon what it is reasonable to expect of the regulated industry,
but also what the adverse consequences would be if the industry were
prevented through enforcement action from carrying on its trade.
Matthew Holden has convincingly described pollution control as a
bargaining process.s Command of relevant information is a powerful
resource which polluting industries have in bargaining. Holden says,
To tell a firm to stop a certain discharge practice is to tell it to
assume a cost which it has been able to pass on to someone else.
7. Statement of Nathaniel P. Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Fish and Wildlife
and Parks, Before the House Government Operations Subcammittee, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
8. Holden, Jr., Pollution Control as a Bargaining Process: An Eoisay on Regulatory
Decision-Making (Cornell Water Resources Center, Oct. 1966).
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Yet this cannot be done without reference to whether or not the
firm can afford to do so. In general, only the firm or industry itself
is likely to have the relevant information on such matters as the
importance of the firm or industry in the political economy, the
nature of the product and process, and the related possibilities for
technical adaptation. And the firm or industry is likely to be
secretive, both because of the uses which its competitors might
make of such information and because of the uses which public
officials might make of it.9

Regulators must establish a fund of good will, common interest and
established links of communication with the regulated. In the end,
this often means that regulating agencies are more receptive to
information from the regulated industry than from environmental
groups. Understandably then, the Federal Power Commission, at
tuned to the electric industry's case for new sites, was not sensitive to
information from conservationists about the consequences of licensing
power plants such as Storm King until the courts directed the
Commission to take the environment into account. 10
CONTENT OF INFORMATION affects its reception by decision
makers. Dexter has illustrated the fact that a Congressman hears most
often from those who agree with him, and that some men automati
cally interpret what they hear to bolster their own viewpoints.11
Agencies, too, seek out information which supports actions toward
which they are already inclined. In his case study of the planning
process within the Army Corps of Engineers on the DelMarVa
Waterway, Leonard Shabman noted that the Corps paid meticulous
attention to the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife and the
Bureau of Outdoor Recreation reviews of the Pocomoke Canal, a
structure the Corps had no enthusiasm to build. A memo in Corps files
affixed to unfavorable comments read, "This is exactly what we hoped
to get from BOR. Beautiful example of interagency coordination." 12
Decision makers are particularly receptive to categories of infor
mation which justify and legitimize their decision making process.13
Cost benefit analysis is favored information to legislators and natural
resource agencies. The ratio of benefits to costs provides a rationale
for not pursuing certain projects while at the same time the economic
9. ld. at 33.
10. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d
Cir. 1965).
11. Dexter, The Representative and His District, New Perspectives on the House of
Representatives 3-28 (1963).
12. Shabman, DelMarVa Waterway Report, Cornell U. Water Resources & Marine Sciences
Center (1972).
13. Downs, Some Thoughts on Giving Peaple Economic Advice, 9 Am. Behavioral Scientist
30-32 (1965).
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tool is flexible enough to supply a justification to projects which have
strong support. As Herbert Marshall put it, "one of the principal uses
of benefit/ cost analysis is to clothe politically desirable projects in the
fig leaf of economic respectability." 14 Decision makers have a strong
· preference for kinds of information which can be applied to
politically viable solutions. Dean Schooler has pointed out that
physical technologies produced by the physical, medical, biological
and engineering sciences are favored by policy makers over beha
vioral technologies which emerge from the political, social, economic
and psychological sciences. Behavioral technologies have the disad
vantage to the decision maker of implying new life styles, shifts in
values and changed patterns of behavior which are likely to produce
conflict.15 It is far more difficult, for instance, to focus on the
behavioral requirements for reducing the demand for electric energy
than to concentrate upon a technical solution such as fusion to
generate more energy for everybody.
In a politically controversial situation, a decision maker is likely to
be receptive to information content which places the issue in new
terms amenable to settlement. An illustration can be found in the
Central Arizona Project debate revolving around the Grand Canyon
dams.16 The Bureau of Reclamation, historically a hydroelectric
power agency, would never have considered the financial support of
coal fired steam plants as a possible alternative to dams had not the
conservationists drawn a stalemate on the issue in Congress.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DECISION MAKER affect the
information that is rece'ived. The background and experience of a
decision maker screens his receptivity in favor of disciplines and facts
with which he feels familiar and comfortable, and the recruitment
patterns of an agency affects its ability to collect and assimilate data.
The dominance of engineers in federal construction agencies has
affected their bias toward construction solutions and their lack of
receptivity to environmental concerns. Indicative of the balance, in
the Army Corps of Engineers the Civil Works Study Board found that
of the 622 professionals whose sole responsibility was planning, 91
percent were engineers.17 Organizational militancy affects the kind of
data collected and the way it is fed into the decision-making process.
In his study of the Forest Service, Ashley Schiff found that research on
14. Marshall, Politics and Efficiency in Water Development, Water Research 294 (196.5).
15. Schooler, Political Arenas, Life Styles and the Impact of Technology on Policymaking, l
Policy Sciences 275-87 (1970); Science and Public Policy (1971).
16. A case history can be found in H. Ingram Patterns of Politics in Water Resources
Development: A Case Study of New Mexico's Role in the Colorado River Basin Bill, (1969).
17. Civil Works Study Bd. of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess.
Civil Works Program of the Corp of Engineers (Comm. Print 1966).
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controlled burning and the effect of vegetal cover on stream flow was
heavily influenced by the doctrines which administrators found useful
in promoting the agency. Research was too closely identified spiritual
ly and structurally with "the cause" to impartially identify and
investigate problems of forestry management.1 8 For similar reasons,
the multidisciplinary staffing of the Soil Conservation Service has not
affected any particular receptivity to alien ideas. The SCS is a very
unified organization with strong centralized control.19 The agency's
pattern of a "universalist" (what the well grained soil conservationist
should be) is of the same cut regardless of discipline or area of the
country.
RULES AND REGULATIONS structure the formal behavior of
organizations and give legitimacy to whatever information collected
and transmitted according to the rules that is actually considered by
the agency. It is doubtful, however, if rules can build certain
information into the decision making process than would otherwise
not be considered. ff the rules require that a decision maker consider
data which imply large policy changes, then the decision maker is
likely to bend the rules to fit the incremental strategy which is both
more comfortable and safe.
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 195820 is ambitious in its
stated purposes. Equal consideration for fish and wildlife conservation
along with other features of water resources development such as
navigation, flood control and irrigation is supposed to take place. The
rules in every construction agency require it to consult with the
federal bureau and state game and fish departments whenever they
propose major water development projects. There is no provision that
conservation agency recommendations be accepted, however, and in
practice conservation viewpoints affect decisions only when it suits
the construction agency, or when a coalition of interests lends some
muscle to the conservation viewpoint.21
LEARNING CAPACITY affects a decision maker's receptivity to
information. This complex notion merits a more lengthy discussion
than is possible here, but in general learning capacity is related to the
amount of uncommitted inner resources.22 An individual can restruc
ture the way he responds to external information, provided he has
certain resources to invest. He must command sufficient intellectual
and emotional capability to recognize the inappropriateness of his
present actions, and he must not be under stress. In the same way an
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Schiff, Fire and Water; Scientific Heresy in the Forest Service (1962).
Hardin, The Politics of Agriculture 66 (1952).
16 U.S.C. 661 et seq. (1964).
Allee and Ingram, supra note 6, at ch. 3 & 7.
For extended theoretical treatment see Deutsch, Nerves of Government (1966).
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organization can, with adequate competent staff and budget and
time, alter its reception of information. The process of adjusting to
new sources of information is typically slow. Decision makers
repeatedly encounter troublesome opposition and conflict and seek
out ways to deal with negative feedback. Decisions are altered
marginally and tentatively, as the decision maker tests for a more
positive response. Through numerous incremental adjustments new
channels of communciation are established.
Decison makers, including resource agencies, differ in their ability
to learn. Among them, the Army Corps of Engineers demonstrates
better than average flexibility. It is responding to local conflict with
an energetic public participation program, and is increasingly
receptive to non-structural solutions to flood control problems. The
chief's offiice has directed Corps divisions to come up with new plans
directed toward urban problems. Most important, the Corps has
responded to pollution with planning studies of regional waste
management. This capacity to innovate is associated to some extent
with the fact that the organization has some surplus resources. The
size of its program, for instance, gives the Corps leeway to ex
periment. Nearly three-quarters of all federal water development is
under the aegis of the Corps.
TIMING of information affects the nature of its reception. Chances
are that decision makers will be most receptive to new information
during the sorting out phase of an emerging issue. If a decision maker
is uncertain about the values involved in the question, and about his
risks and options, he is apt to be relatively open to all suggestions
which appear helpful. Information is likely to have its greatest impact
early in the planning process while the need for an airport, highway,
dam, power plant or pipeline is still being discussed, and before a site
is selected. Once the issue has been placed in a context, the decision
maker will follow routine patterns and listen to regular sources.

FACTORS AFFECTING WHAT INFORMATION IS
GENERATED AND TRANSMITTED
In a democratic society it is an accepted value that individuals and
groups will have the opportunity to participate in or be represented
in decisions that affect them.23 However, in the real world of
fragmented, inconsistent and often incoherent policy, not every
interest group participates in decisions that affect its concerns. The
focus of interests is likely to be upon those dedsion points and
decision makers where access and impact can be most easily
achieved.
23. Fox, Strategic Considerations in Attnining Water Planning Goals, J. Water Pollution
Control (1966).
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The effective means of expressing most interests in the political
system is through organizations, including interest groups and agen
cies oriented toward particular interests. Whether or not an interest
group or an agency spokesman for an interest voices its concern in
decision-making depends upon its perception of the potential costs
and benefits involved in generating and transmitting information.
Such organizations' calculus is constrained by the hierarchy of
importance among decisions affecting its interest and the budget of
resources it has to expend in participating in decision making.24 The
following factors affect an interest group's or interest oriented
agency's willingness to generate and transmit information reflecting
its concerns.
THE PERCEPTION OF THE DECISION and what is at stake
affects what information is generated and transmitted. An organiza
tion's evaluation of what is at issue is a function of its goals and
perceptions. The core interest of the traditional conservation move
ment represented by such organizations as the Izaac Walton League,
National Parks Association, Audubon Society, Wilderness Society,
National Wildlife Federation, and Sierra Club is the preservation of
natural areas through parks and other reserves. The decisions made by
natural resource agencies are perceived as essentially developmental
decisions fostering growth of particular industries and regions. For the
most part decisions made by such agencies as the Bureau of
Reclamation, the Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Public Roads
is outside the purview of conservation. It is only when a park, wild
river, or trout stream is threatened that the actions of these agencies
become relevant.
The newer envimomental groups, emerging in the 1970's have
tended to focus on individual family consumptive decisions rather
than governmental actors. The public has been directed to stop
littering, use returnable bottles, use pollution free detergents, buy non
leaded gasoline, reduce water and pesticide use, tune up autos and so
on. Some observers see both the traditional conservation groups and
new environmentalists currently altering their focus toward a wide
range of public decisions. Governmental action is seen as a way of
preserving the environment, and changes in present government
decisions are viewed as essential if environmental quality is to be
achieved. 25 A new assessment by environmental groups of the role of
public decisions in reaching environmental goals will foster the
24. Shabman, Decision Making in Water Resources Investment and the Potential of
Multi-Objective Planning: The Case of the Army Corps of Engineers ch. 4 (Cornell Water
Resources and Marine Sciences Center 1972).
25. Morrision, Hornback, & Warner, The Environmental Movement: Some Preliminary
Observations, Social Behavior, Natural Resources, and the Environment, (forthcoming).
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generation of different kinds of information designed to influence
political actors.
An interest group or an agency expressing a particular interest will
react first to what it perceives as imminent and direct effects upon its
interest .and will react later, with a lower order of effort, to questions
with an indirect and remote impact. The direct impact of a dam,
highway, or power plant is experienced in jobs, growth and profits.
The indirect environmental implications are less immediate and
much harder to predict. Partly for this reason, development interests
have traditionally had more communications links with natural
resources decision makers than have environmental groups. Because
of the remote impact of planning decisions, conservation interests
have not been motivated to make much of an input into planning
studies. Nothing happens to many plans, even authorized ones, as
illustrated by the fifteen billion dollar backlog of authorized water
projects. If plans come to fruition, it is often far in the future. The
average time for the planning and construction of civil works projects
by the Army Corps of Engineers is currently seventeen years and
eleven months. Construction agency planners have not traditionally
made much effort to present their plans as important and immediate
to conservation groups outside the regular constituency of the agency.
Like other parts and decision making, the incremental strategy has
restricted the scope of planning.
THE EXPECTED IMPACT of information affects whether it will be
transmitted and its content. The corollary of the notion that decision
makers hear what they want to hear is that organizations will transmit
information to decision makers when they believe it will get a
hearing. The crucial points for stopping a dam or highway for
conservation interests have not been on the local level where
development benefits have their strongest appeal or within agencies
whose mission it is to build public works. Instead it has been the
national political leaders including members of Congress who have
been open to conservationist persuasion. As a result opposition
interests which fail to show up at agency hearings have a habit of
surfacing later when projects reach a national decision making arena.
The tremendous increase in citizen's suits attests to the willingness of
environmental interests to prepare a case for whatever decision
makers, in this case the judges, they perceive to be sympathetic.
Federal review agencies which express conservationist and
recreation interests, including the Bureau of Sports Fish and Wildlife,
the National Park Service, and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation,
focus their comments on what they believe is achievable in the
incremental process of decision making. Reviews tend to be pro-forma
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unless the proposed project threatens an important interest. Even
then the message of these agencies is seldom outright opposition since
past experience has shown it is usually unsuccessful. Instead reviewers
suggest changes in design and location of the project, and mitigating
and compensating features such as recreational access and facilities, a
wildlife sanctuary, fish hatchery, fish ladder etc.
It is possible, of course, that environmental interests may despair of
influencing particular decision makers and use public hearings to
appeal to the broader citizen audience. In such cases environmental
groups will talk past decision makers with a general message aimed at
rallying supporters to the cause, and impart little to the decision
maker which relates to the choices he has at hand.
The RESOURCES of an organization affect what information it can
generate and transmit. Unity and cohesion are important resources.26
The environmental movement has suffered from fragementation and
internal division. The number of groups is growing as well as
membership. The Council of Environmental Quality estimated that
there are over 5,000 environmental organizations in the United
States.27 These groups differ in their conceptions of environmental
quality. A unified strategy, even on limited specific issues, is often
impossible for them to agree upon and execute. Very often environ
mental groups are in competition for another important resource,
membership. Up until recently lack of numbers has been a resource
limitation. The Sierra Club, for instance, had only 30,000 members in
1966. A great deal of the energy and resources environmental groups
have has been plowed back into the organizations in membership and
fund raising drives.
The older conservation organizations have been mainly national
organizations with a national appeal, but with only a few members
scattered in localities. As a result, it has been much more possible to
mount a national campaign than to stop a project on the local level.
Thus the National Parks Association could cause the Bureau of
Reclamation proposal to build Echo Park Dam great difficulties in
Congress in the 1950's but could not dent the staunch support of Utah
residents.28
Data base and expertise is a requirement for meaningful participa
tion in natural resources decisions. Much of the debate on issues such
as nuclear reactor safety, thermal pollution, air and water quality
measurements, etc. takes place in technical terms. Environmental
groups have solicited the aid of biologists and foresters in testimony
26. Truman, The Governmental Process 167 (1955).
27. Council on Environmental Quality, Letter from Staff, 1973.
28. Stratton & Sirotkin, The Echo Park Controversy (1959).
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on clear cutting and have hired economists to do benefit cost analysis
of water projects. The availability of experts on the staff or within the
membership is a valuable resource. Without specialists, an organiza
tion can not substantiate an independent position or even interpret
data which comes in from outside.
Lack of adequate staffing and budget have been persistent
problems for the Bureau of Sports Fish and Wildlife in voicing the
conservationist position. Up until a few years ago the River Basin
Studies Division which has been assigned to review water develop
ment proposals of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of
Reclamation, and the Soil Conservation Service were dependent upon
the lead construction agency to fund their evaluations. Today about
half the budget for BSF and W review comes form outside. These
budgetary restraints are compounded by other resource limitations
which affect the kind of reviews it makes. A division handbook
describes the difficulty of the River Basin Studies Planner.
Usually he is operating against a deadline, frequently a short
one-nearly always shorter than the lead planning agency-and
often with less adequate tools and manpower. Nearly always, too,
he has less adequate basic data and information than much that is
available to the lead agency . . . The parameters dealt with by
the RBS and lead agency planners are of different orders of
complexity, variability and recognized utility. Thus the basic data
on climate and hydrology have been long recognized as valuable
to Man's welfare, while comparably basic data on fish and wildlife
populations and their dynamics not only are less widely valued,
but they are far more difficult to obtain.29
The National Environmental Policy Act 30 (NEPA) was designed to
alter the existing channels of communication in policy making
affecting the environment. The principal thrust of Section 102 (2) (C)
was to establish a new "action-forcing" provision to assure detailed
research and full consideration of environmental impacts in decision
making. 3l Judged by the number of court cases which environmental
organizations have won under NEPA directing government agencies
to comply, the legislation has been a success. Citizen's suits have
produced court orders blocking or delaying a variety of projects
including the Alaska oil pipeline, <la.ms, highways, nuclear and
29. River Basins. Studies Division, Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife, Procedures &
Techniques of Fish and Wildlife Analysis & Planning.
30. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (1970). (hereinafter
cited as NEPA).
31. Report on the Administration of the National Environmental Policy Act, Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, H.R. Rep. No. 316, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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hydroelectric power plants, canals and logging in national forests.32
There is considerable difference, however, between sand in the
wheels of progress on specific projects and actually altering the
patterns of communication in decision making. What impact has
NEPA had on what decision makers actually hear, and what
information is actually generated and transmitted?
Section 102 of NEPA requires that all agencies of the Federal
Government prepare detailed environmental impact statements on
proposals for legislation and other major actions significantly affecting
the environment. In impact statements agencies are directed to
consider: (1) the environmental impact of the proposed action; (2) any
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented; (3) alternatives to the proposed action; (4)
the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity;
and (5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. In the
process of preparing impact statements, federal agencies are to
consult with other federal agencies which have jurisdiction, by law or
special expertise, with respect to any environmental impact involved.
Environmental statements and accompanying comments are to be
made available to the President, the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) and the public and are to accompany proposals
throughout the review process. The Council has issued guidelines, and
each federal agency has developed or is working on formal procedures
for preparing and processing 102 statements.
NEPA AND DECISION MAKERS
The ISSUE CONTEXT, or the framework in which a decision maker
conceives a problem and the information he considers relevant is built
up over time and experience and is highly resistant to change. The
incremental model of decision making suggests that decision makers
relate closely to past experience. They consider only alternatives
which differ marginally from those taken into account in previous
decisions. The informal rules of decision which dictate what informa
tion is relevant and what can be dismissed are only loosely related to
the formal rules and procedures with which the decision maker
complies on paper. It is unreasonable to expect, then, that an
alteration of formal procedure such as NEPA could, by itself,
accomplish much change in issue contexts in established programs.
There is ample evidence of a reluctance to change decision making
procedure even formally. A number of Congressmen and administra32. Zeldin, Will Success Spoil NEPA, Audobon 106-11 (July 1972).
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tors see NEPA as introducing additional red tape.33 The initial failure
of agencies to comply with the procedural requirements of the act has
led to a great deal of litigation. A spate of bills were introduced into
the 92nd Congress to provide specific exemptions from NEPA.34 And,
even as agencies adjust to procedural requirements, and they are
presently on the whole complying, it is still possible for decision
makers to favor information on development rather than environmen
tal impact. Although the environmental impact statement on the
Alaska pipeline acknowledged severe environmental effects, the
Secretary of the Interior recommended approval of the pipeline on
the basis of economics and national security.
NEPA requires that an agency preparing an impact statement
obtain the comments of other Federal, State and local agencies having
jurisdiction or special expertise on any environmental impacts
involved. Under the Freedom of Information Act,35 the agency must
make draft statements and comments available to the public and any
individual or organization may comment. The Council of Environ
mental Quality receives statements and may also comment. Theoreti
cally, then, agencies have broad sources of environmental information
to call upon. Whether these SOURCES are actually considered in
decision making depends partly upon the agency's evaluation of their
political significance. No agency, including the Council on Environ
mental Quality (CEQ), is authorized to veto a project proposed by
another agency on the basis of an adverse environmental statement.
CEQ prepares guidelines and monitors the preparation of environ
mental statements. Under the law,36 it may, but is not required to
comment. As part of the President's staff, CEQ can recommend that
the President reject a project. This option was exercised in halting the
Cross Florida Barge Canal, but otherwise has not often been used. As
Presidential advisers, the informal persuasion of agencies by the CEQ
may be effective. Chairman Russell Train told a Congressional
Committee, "if we are troubled by a proposed action, either in whole
or in part, we generally say so-and there have been cases, to my
knowledge, proposals that have been withdrawn, never see the light
3
of
_ day, if you will, I think because of our reaction." 7 However, in its
33. Hearings on Red Tape-Inquiring into Delays and Excesssive Paperwork in Administmton
of Public Works Programs Before the Subcommittee of Investigations and Oversight of the
Committee on Public Works, 92nd Cong., 1st. Sess. (1971).

34. For a partial listing see National Wildlife Federation, Conservation Report No. 12, (Apr.
14, 1972).
35. 5 u.s.c. 22(1964).
36. NEPA.
37. Hearings on the Administration of the National Environmental Policy Act Before the
Subcomittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conseroation of the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 13 (1971).
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review of the implementation of NEPA in seven agencies, the
Comptroller General's office found that much of the formal and
informal guidance given by CEQ to Agencies focused on the
inclusiveness and quality of particular statements, not upon the
procedure whereby statements were integrated into decision
making.38
Under its own legislative mandate, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has a particular responsibility to review impact
statements from the perspective of its broad environmental concerns.
Responsiblity is different from vigorous effort, which the General
Accounting Office Report, cited above, found wanting. The causes for
failure to generate and transmit information relate to EPA's own
perspectives and resources and will be discussed below. Whether or
not EPA could become a significant source of environmental informa
tion is related in part to its strength in Congress, the White House and
with its own environmental constituency.
Court decisions are of increasing concern to agencies. Failure to
satisfy the courts has cost agencies troublesome delays. Up until the
present the courts have concentrated upon the procedure required by
NEPA, not the substance of decision making. If this stance is
maintained the courts will become less salient as agencies meet the
necessary procedures. In the Calvert Clijfs 39 decision, a U.S. Court
of Appeals held that if a decision is reached procedurally without
individual consideration and balancing of environmental factors,
conducted fully and in good faith, the courts will examine the weight
of environmental information in the decision making process. Histori
cally, however, courts have been reluctant to second guess agencies
on the substance of decisions.
Environmental considerations were given formal recognition in
NEPA. As a result, environmental data gained stature and credibility
with decision makers. However, agencies are reluctant to take
information which is likely to produce conflict and make decisions
more difficult to reach. It is logical to expect that an agency will
include in draft and final statements the data which best supports its
own decisions and decision making process. Left to their own devices,
without external oversight, impact statements are likely to become
justifications to environmentalists of what the agency has determined
to do.
NEPA promises to alter the CHARACTER OF DECISION
MAKERS, and in the long run the changes it makes in agency
38. Comptroller General, Report on Improvements Needed in Federal Efforts to Implement
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (1972).
39. 449 F.2d. ll09 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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recruitment and personnel can significantly alter channels of commu
nication. It takes life scientists to write environmental statements, and
biologists are being brought into federal agencies in significant
numbers. The Bureau of Reclamation, for example, has placed at least
one G.S. 14 biologist in each of its regions to supervise the preparation
of environmental impact statements. How much effect newly
recruited individuals with environmental expertise have upon the
receptivity of each to environmental concerns will vary according to
the success with which the agency inculcates its traditional orienta
tion and mission into its personnel and its learning capacity.
The charge of Sec. 102 (a) (A) of NEPA to all agencies is a
"systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the inte
grated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental
design arts in planning and decision making." Despite the recruit
ment of life scientists, many agencies are as yet unable to comply.
There is a paucity of funds to attract sufficient numbers of qualified
people. More important, agency prospectives are currently too
narrow to undertake a broad environmental overview. For instance,
the Rocky Mountain Center on the Environment found that one
Forest Service "102" statement had utilized an "interdisciplinary
team" of six timber management specialists.40
Environmental impact statements are apt to be post hoc
evaluation, prepared after decision makers have settled upon a course
of action. A specific project or action has become the center of
attention in the decision making process by the time an environmen
tal impact statement is introduced. The interest by this time within
the agency and among their organizational backers is often to build
support for the proposal, not to re-examine goals and needs. The
General Accounting Office found that for the seven agencies they
reviewed, impact statements were prepared in stages as proposals
moved up the organzational levels toward the final stages of review.
As a result a lower level did not have the benefit of all environmental
aspects of a proposal prior to advancing it to the next organizational
level. In some agencies, such as the Bureau of Reclamation and the
Corps, even top officials did not have a completed statement when
reviewing proposals.41 The Administration, Congress and the public
are allowed 90 days after publication of a draft statement and 30 days
from the final statement to react before an agency can take action.42
By this time it is likely that options are so narrowed and the proposal
has accumulated such support that stopping it is difficult and costly.
40. Hansen, NEPA: Problems and Outer Limits, (1972).
41. Comptroller General, supra note 38.
42. NEPA.
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NEPA AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS
NEPA requires a statement presenting detailed information about
every action with substantial effect upon the environment. It is
possible that environmental interests will be prompted by this
information into an awareness of stakes which were previously
remote. The environmental impact statement may serve as alarm
which activates distracted and latent groups. Whether or not environ
mental groups react to the warning and attempt to establish channels
of communication with agencies depends on their view of agency
receptivity. Certainly such organizations have focused on impact
statements as a means to get court delays. Courts have demonstrated
their receptivity to environmental groups. Whether or not they are
also perceived as a means to communicate with agencies in decision
making is partly a function of the ability of environmental groups to
generate and transmit information.
A central question which experience will finally decide is whether
environmental agencies and groups have ADEQUATE RESOURCES
to make their views known to decision makers on the basis of
environmental statements. Certainly conservation oriented agencies
already engaged in making reviews of projects are likely to feel that
NEPA has afforded them additional resources. The Bureau of Sport
Fisheries and Wildlife and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation are
given additional legal basis for their claim of a say in actions affecting
their interests. They now review impact statements as well as
proposed actions in areas where they already have review preroga
tive, and may consult in the preparation of environmental statements.
These agencies however, still suffer from long-standing budgetary and
staffing restraints which NEPA by itself cannot change.
The volume of §102 statements circulated for comment and review
on the national level threatens to become very large. By November,
1971 draft or final environmental statements for 2040 actions had
accumulated at CEQ. 43 A peak of 50 final and draft statements per
day was anticipated. The Corps of Engineers' permit programs for
waste discharges under the 1899 Refuse Act 44 could alone generate
some 7,000 permits per year and, unless the law is amended,
environmental impact statements are required on each one. Such
numbers place a great strain on agencies such as CEQ and EPA and
constitute an information overload.
The Council of Environmental Quality, as most staff agencies of the
President tend to be, is a very small organization. Its present staff is at
43. Council on Environmental Quality, 1, 102 Monitor, no 10, 1971.
44. 33 u.s.c. 407, 411, 413 (1970).
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30 professionals, and many of these engage in matters apart from §102
statement reviews. At the beginning of 1972, only one man
covered all statements on environmental impacts of water projects
proposed by the Corps, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Soil
Conservation Service. Unless some federal conservation agency or
environmental group brings a particular project to the reviewer's
attention, environmental impact statements are apt to get no more
than general oversight. CEQ's outlook upon its reponsibilities with
regard to §102 statements are bound to be affected by the fact that
the agency is designed to serve the President. It is unlikely that the
President desires or can afford to become involved in large numbers of
controversies over governmental activities detrimental to the environ
ment. In consequence, CEQ is unlikely to openly challenge very
many governmental actions.
In light of the other demands upon its attention, the Environmental
Protection Agency also faces severe limitations in regard to its review
of environmental statements. EPA is a young agency, created in
1970, and much of its resources are taken up in establishing its own
internal organization. Further, EPA has a number of difficult regula
tory programs to administer including water and air pollution, control
of pesticides, radiation protection, and solid wastes management. It is
likely that these activities have a priority over environmental impact
statement review. The experience with EPA's handling of Environ
mental Impact Statements has been that the agency is very slow.
EPA's first listing of comments on statements was published in the
Federal Register on January 18, 1972, approximately two years after
the enactment of NEPA. The agency has complained to the CEQ that
the quality of statements was poor, but with the exception of the
Atomic Energy Commission, EPA has not yet sent guidelines to other
federal agencies setting forth the type of information needed for EPA
to carry on its review responsiblities.45
Environmental interest groups have problems similar to those of
environmental agencies in exploiting NEPA. A survey of member
organizations of the Natural Resources Council of America, a large
coalition of groups, revealed that none had the necessary personnel to
conduct an in-depth review of the volume of environmental state
ments anticipated on specific projects. It was estimated that one
man-day was necessary simply to determine the adequacy of an
impact statement concerning a Corps of Engineers project and
one-half man-day for a simple highway impact statement. An
in-depth review would take much more staff time, varying according
45. Comptroller General, supra note 38.
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to the complexity of the subject. In all cases it would be necessary for
the reviewer to have detailed information of his own.46
Independent detailed information about the impact of a proposed
government action upon the environment most likely will come from
local environmental interests familiar with the project area. The
number of local environmental groups has increased impressively, and
the growing membership of national groups has strengthened their
local base. While a few years ago national interest groups called
attention to impending degradations, now local groups exist to
strongly oppose actions harmful to the environment on the local level.
Communication between national and local levels on environmental
statements remain a problem. Local groups will probably have to
signal national organizations about projects proposed by field offices
of federal agencies so that particularly important environmental
statements can be sifted out and monitored. Timing, too, remains a
significant problem for effective communications from environmental
groups. The Rocky Mountain Center on the Environment estimates
that it takes 80 to 90 days to react to a §102 statement. Agencies may
well have taken action before interest groups can generate and
transmit information.47
CONCLUSIONS

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is being hailed as
effective by its friends and foes alike. The National Audubon
magazine has called it the "first effective environmental law of the
land," while Senator Gordon Allott has said that it is a means of
promoting mischief and should be reviewed,48 and Secretary of
Interior Rogers Morton has blamed NEPA for the delay in the
department's activities to overcome the energy crises.49 Most of these
reactions are based upon the achievements of citizen lawsuits
compelling government agencies to comply with the procedural
requiremens of the Act. Evaluated in terms of the long term
effectiveness in forging new channels of communication to broaden
the environmental information base upon which public policy is
made, proclamations of success are not yet warranted.
NEPA has been examined here from the perspective of the
incremental process of decision making. A great deal of relevant
information is ordinarily outside the purview of any decision maker
46. Natural Resources Council of America, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee On Environmental Impact Statements (mimeo) (Aug. 12, 1971).
47. Hansen, supra note 40.
48. Zeldin, supra note 32.
49. Hearings on Fuel and Energy Resources Before the House Interior and Insular Affairs
Comm., 92nd Cong., 2d Session (1972).
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who typically concentrates upon marginal alterations from the status
quo. Information becomes relevant to the decision maker when he
becomes convinced that it will help him, or that he cannot afford to
ignore it. New rules and regulations are not likely, by themselves, to
force a decision maker to take into account interests and concerns he
would not otherwise consider, despite the claims of NEPA's sponsors
that its provisions are action forcing. Instead, NEPA may facilitate
change in communications channels where decision makers are
already in search of alternatives to avoid the conflict with environ
mentalists which have made their past patterns of decision-making
uncomfortable. Realistically, it should be expected that receptivity to
environmental interests will come about incrementally and unevenly
among government agencies. The extent to which it happens depends
upon the continuing strength and activity of environmental interest
groups. The passage of NEPA can be viewed as an outcome of past
failures of environmentalists to get the ear of decision makers. It will
take the sustained effort of environmentalists to make it work.

